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INTRODUCTION
The key policy rate of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central
bank base rate) is the interest rate remunerated on the two-
week MNB bills purchased by credit institutions.
Consequently, the two-week bill is a key instrument in the
monetary policy of Hungary. Using the two-week bills, credit
institutions deposit liquidity with the MNB (which, in fact,
translates into funds deposited into central bank accounts, i.e.
central bank money). The key instrument therefore
constitutes the central bank’s liabilities to credit institutions,
which means that the banking sector has excess liquidity.
While excess liquidity has consistently characterised Hungary
since 1995, this phenomenon is not specific to Hungary. It
has been observed in other Central European economies
following the political transition and is a frequent
phenomenon in other emerging countries as well. It was
typically generated by various forms of external capital
inflows, while the selected exchange rate system had a
fundamental impact as well.
Since the introduction of this instrument in 2007 the amount
of two-week bills has tripled, rising to more HUF 3,000 billion
by August 2009. This accounts for more than one third of the
total liabilities of the central bank and at the same time
represents a large portion – around one-tenth – of the banking
sector’s total assets. The positive inflow observed in the past
year resulted primarily from the foreign currency financing of
the government deficit, and conversion of the related foreign
currency funds into forints at the MNB. In respect of these
rapid flows, questions came to the forefront about the possible
consequences of this process. In this regard, several analyses
have been published on how the MNB bills may crowd out
government securities from the market, and how the large
volume of bills may lead to a decline in banks’ lending activity
through their favourable interest rates.
On the other hand, several foreign central banks have started
the process of quantitative easing, also resulting in expanding
balance sheets at these central banks. Nonetheless, it is
important to stress that the growth in the volume of MNB
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The two-week MNB bill is a central component of Hungary’s monetary policy instruments; it is a key instrument of the
central bank, the interest rate of which is identical to the central bank base rate. By mid-2009, the outstanding amount of
MNB bills reached HUF 3,000 billion, which – in addition to representing one third of the central bank’s liabilities –
accounts for a significant part of the domestic banking sector’s liquid assets. By using the two-week bill to absorb the excess
liquidity of the banking sector, the central bank ensures that developments in banks’ interest rates will be driven by the MNB
bill as an opportunity cost. The volume of these liquid assets builds up gradually, regardless of banks’ willingness to lend.
Indeed, the growth observed in the holdings of MNB bills helped to relieve the liquidity tensions of credit institutions and
contributed to gradually reducing the role of this factor in the decline in lending activity in 2009. Nonetheless, lending
remained restrained despite the ample liquidity, which primarily reflects banks’ deteriorating risk appetite. One of the major
correlations in the central bank’s balance sheet is the fact that, while credit institutions are free to decide on the volume of
two-week MNB bills they purchase at the individual level, they are unable to affect the volume of bills in the overall banking
sector. The accelerated growth rate in the volume of two-week bills observed in the previous year resulted from the use of
foreign currency loans to finance the general government, which implies that the large volume of two-week bills is a
consequence of poor demand in the government securities market, rather than the reason for this. In a regional comparison,
however, the relatively high central bank base rate does not affect the volume of the key instrument, as the central bank
interest rate has no direct impact on the liquidity of the banking sector.
Csaba Balogh: The role of MNB bills in domestic
financial markets. What is the connection
between the large volume of MNB bills, bank
lending and demand in the government
securities markets?*
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.bills observed in the previous period did not result from
classical quantitative easing, i.e. active market intervention by
the MNB, but instead primarily stemmed from factors
beyond the central bank’s influence.
In this paper, we first present the role of the MNB bill in the
central bank’s monetary policy, followed by an overview of
factors determining developments in the volume of the bills.
Then we provide a detailed analysis of three issues related to
the volume of bills. First, whether the central bank base rate
affects the volume of these bills; second, whether the large
amount of bills influences demand for government securities;
and third, their effect on bank lending.
THE ROLE OF MNB BILLS IN MONETARY
POLICY
In 2001 the MNB decided to abandon its exchange rate
target (crawling peg exchange rate regime) and adopt an
inflation targeting monetary system. In small, open
economies this means that monetary policy makers (in our
case the Monetary Council) set the key policy rate relying on
inflation and real economy forecasts as well as money market
and financial stability analyses. In the next step, through
monetary policy instruments, the central bank ensures that
financial market yields and expectations about those yields
adjust to the key policy rate. Through changes in the forint
exchange rate on the one hand, and Hungarian interest rate
levels on the other hand, shifts in market yields modify the
behaviour of market participants and change economic
prospects; thus, by updating central bank forecasts and
analyses, the Monetary Council has the opportunity at its
next session to base its decision on new information.
The monetary policy instruments of the central bank are
defined as the sum of the forint denominated money market
and capital market operations performed by the MNB. The
most important element of forint market instruments is the
main policy instrument, i.e. the two-week MNB bill, the
interest rate of which controls forint market yields.
1 The credit
institution counterparts of the MNB (hereinafter simply banks)
can decide how many bills they wish to buy at the weekly
auctions, i.e. how much of their holdings with the MNB they
wish to hold in two-week bills. All bids submitted by the banks
are accepted by the MNB without restriction. Moreover, in
order to provide banks with sufficient central bank money to
fulfil their payment obligations, the central bank traditionally
supports banks’ liquidity management through two additional
instruments: the reserve requirement, which is subject to a
monthly averaging mechanism, and the interest rate corridor.
2
In order to fulfil their payment obligations resulting from
larger interbank and client transactions, individual banks’
demand for central bank money may increase significantly on
certain days. Banks can satisfy their liquidity needs primarily
on the interbank market, but to prevent individual banks’
temporary liquidity surplus or liquidity shortage from
generating drastic fluctuations in interbank yields, in line with
the general practice of central banks, the MNB has adopted the
two instruments described above.
The provisions of the reserve requirement ensure that banks
maintain a minimum account balance with the MNB at all
times. Indeed, banks may fulfil their reserve requirement by
depositing the required funds calculated as a monthly average
into their “current account” (settlement account) at the
central bank. This allows them to adjust their day-to-day
account balances flexibly during the specific month,
dampening the effect of potential liquidity shocks. In
addition, up to the amount of their reserve requirement, the
central bank pays the banks the central bank base rate;
therefore, they do not suffer an interest loss.
3 On the other
hand, as the portion of the account balance in excess of the
reserve amount does not bear interest, on a monthly average
the account balances banks held with the MNB are practically
always limited to the currently required reserves.
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1The MNB has used deposit-type policy instruments since 1995. Initially, this was a reverse repo operation, which was replaced by the one-month deposit in 1997, and
the two-week deposit in 1999. In 2007, the two-week deposit was replaced by the two-week MNB bill. For more details, please see Balogh–Varga (2006) and MNB
(2002, 2006).
2 With a view to assisting banks in their liquidity management, from the autumn of 2008 the MNB introduced several additional instruments, including the overnight
FX swap facility.
3 By contrast, before Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 the interest rate paid by the MNB was lower than the market yields, and therefore the minimum reserve
system featured an implicit tax burden at the time.
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analysisThe other instrument is the interest rate corridor defined by
interest rates on overnight central bank loan and deposit
instruments, which are set close to the key policy rate. The
width of the interest rate corridor currently maintained by
the MNB around the key policy rate is ±0.5 percentage
points. Accordingly, if the base rate is 8%, banks can obtain
overnight loans at an interest rate of 8.5% and receive
interest of 7.5% on their overnight deposits. The interest
rate corridor moderates the volatility of interbank interest
rates by setting a lower and an upper limit, over which
banks will not be willing to carry out interbank
transactions. If the conditions are worse than that, it will be
more advantageous for banks to use the central bank
deposit or loan facility. Under normal market
circumstances, banks’ recourse to overnight instruments is
restricted to a minimum as they typically manage their
liquidity through transactions conducted in the interbank
market.
4
On the whole, under normal market circumstances, central
bank instruments facilitate the implementation of monetary
policy by keeping interbank interest rates close to the
interest rate on the two-week MNB bill, while the
fluctuation in the latter is mitigated by the minimum reserve
requirement and the interest rate corridor. Interbank
interest rates, on their part, determine the opportunity cost
of banks’ funds, on the basis of which banks price their
deposit and loan products. Therefore, it is the key policy
rate and expectations about the key policy rate that
eventually determine the relevant deposit and loan interest
rates for actors of the economy.
THE INCREASE OBSERVED IN THE
VOLUME OF MNB BILLS IN THE PAST
YEAR PRIMARILY REFLECTS A
MOUNTING STOCK OF FOREIGN
CURRENCY RESERVES
Although, based on the above, the MNB considers the
interest rate on the two-week bill to be of key importance,
the total volume of outstanding MNB bills does not play a
prominent role in monetary policy. On the one hand, the
volume has no direct effect on economic developments, and
on the other hand, it is typically influenced by factors over
which the MNB has no control. Using the simplified balance
sheet of the MNB is the easiest way to demonstrate the
contribution of the factors influencing the volume of bills.
The MNB bill is one of the most significant items on the
liability side of the central bank’s balance sheet. Other than
currency in circulation (the only interest-free liability of the
central bank) and government deposits, no other item
matches the two-week bill in terms of magnitude. By
contrast, foreign currency reserves constitute the most
dominant item on the asset side, as the central bank buys
forint-denominated securities and provides forint-
denominated loans in exceptional cases only. To put it
simply: the MNB holds its liabilities arising from currency in
circulation, deposits of banks and the government in foreign
currency reserves.
Only in exceptional cases does the MNB influence the foreign
currency reserves on the asset side. Essentially, this item is
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2009 8
Assets Liabilities
July July Yearly July July  Yearly
2008 2009 changes 2008 2009 changes
External assets (FX reserves) 4,142 7,859 3,717  Currency in circulation 2,150  2,210  59 
Loans of credit institutions –  222  222  Two-week MNB bills 962  2,907  1,945 
Hungarian Government Securities 147  360  213  Current account balances of
Remaining assets 96  456  359  credit institutions 734  341  –393 
Overnight deposits of credit 
institutions 57 414 357 
Swaps with credit institutions –  253  253 
Deposits of central government 430  1,233  803 
Remaining liabilities and capital 51  1,538  1,488 
Total assets 4,385  8,897  4,512  Total liabilities 4,385  8,897  4,512 
Table 1
Monthly average statistical balance sheet of the MNB, July 2008–July 2009
(HUF billions)
4 In this context the past year was an exceptional period; the lack of overall market confidence forced banks to rely much less on interbank markets. Despite a loss of
50 basis points, wary banks resorted to the use of the overnight deposit facility of the MNB far more intensely than in previous periods.increased by the foreign currency revenues (e.g. EU assistance
or foreign currency borrowings) and decreased by the foreign
currency expenses of the government. There are two
exceptions: in the first case, the central bank intervenes in the
foreign exchange market; in other words, it buys or sells
foreign currency with a view to influencing the market
exchange rate of the forint. The central bank resorts to this
instrument in extraordinary cases only (such as the speculative
pressure that accompanied the strengthening of the forint in
early 2003). The second case, when the central bank becomes
indebted in foreign currency, is very rare also (e.g. central
bank borrowing from an international organisation).
On the liability side, the MNB has practically no influence on
changes in the amount of currency in circulation: economic
actors are free to decide how much cash they wish to hold.
Similarly, it has no direct control over the size of government
deposits, or whether the government finances these deposits
from forint or foreign currency funds.
Liabilities vis-à-vis banks constitute the last large item in the
MNB’s balance sheet, including banks’ holdings of two-week
bills, which are defined on the basis of the residual principle.
Namely, if any other balance sheet item is subject to changes
affecting the banks’ central bank accounts, without the
central bank’s active intervention they will adapt to the
change by adjusting their two-week bill portfolio. Banks
could also adapt through their account balances or through
the overnight instruments constituting the interest rate
corridor, but the associated terms and conditions would be
more unfavourable (the MNB does not pay any interest on
excess reserves; moreover, the interest banks receive on
overnight deposits is 0.5% lower than the interest rate on the
two week bill).
5 As such, in the case of MNB bills the MNB
is not a classical security issuer in the sense that refinancing
risk is a meaningless concept for the central bank. The
volume of two-week bills is increased by the liquidity growth
in the banking system, and decreased by a decline in liquidity.
Although liquidity managers at individual banks might decide
to absorb their liquidity surplus in interbank transactions, the
partner bank may face excess liquidity as well. Consequently,
at the level of the banking sector, excess liquidity will
invariably flow into two-week bills eventually. In other
words, while banks may make adjustments to their two-week
bill portfolio at the individual level, they are unable to change
the overall volume of these bills through their interbank
transactions: they merely redistribute liquidity across the
banking sector. This sharply sets apart the correlations that
apply to the individual balance sheets of banks and the
balance sheet of the central bank.
The specific examples below highlight factors which may lead
to an increase in the volume of the MNB bills as a result of
changing the structure of the central bank’s balance sheet:
• an item on the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet
increases:
–  foreign currency reserves increase as the central bank
buys foreign currency in the market
– central bank loans extended to banks increase
–  the central bank’s portfolio of government securities
increases (the central bank buys government securities in
the market)
• or an item on the liability side of the central bank’s balance
sheet decreases:
– a decrease in the account balance of the government’s
account leads to an increase in the account balance of the
banking system, generating a positive flow into two-week
bills.
6
– the account balance of banks decreases. For example, the
minimum reserve ratio is lowered and as a result, the
account balance banks are required to maintain with the
central bank decreases. At the level of the banking sector,
banks are forced to deposit the released funds into two-
week bills, as all other options would imply substantial
losses in interest.
– the volume of currency in circulation decreases. Cash
demand is essentially based on household habits, and as
such, it fluctuates seasonally. Before Christmas, for
example, the cash demand of economic participants
surges, then as the holidays are over, banks record a cash
inflow once again. As a first step, banks can obtain cash
from their central bank account, and subsequently the
MNB credits the same account with the cash returned.
Since banks’ account balances are determined by the
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5 On the other hand, if the MNB decided to restrict the quantity of two-week bills, ceteris paribus, the banking sector would have to use another instrument to absorb
the growing liquidity, meaning that market yields would no longer be defined by the two-week bill. In this case, overnight deposits would be an alternative option
for banks, thus the interest rate on O/N deposits would become the de-facto policy rate. In other words, restricting the quantity of two-week bills would be the
equivalent of an immediate interest rate cut.
6 Most government payments are as such. For instance, the government typically transfers the amount of public salaries (or pensions) to retail accounts with
commercial banks. In the payment system, this process implies a transfer from the Treasury account to the banks’accounts with the central bank, and simultaneously,
the banks credit the accounts of their customers’with the amount deposited to their central bank account.reserve requirements, changes in the cash stock will
eventually be reflected by the two-week bill portfolio.
Therefore a sustained decline in cash demand will lead to
an increase in the volume of MNB bills.
On the whole therefore, if the central bank acts passively
(both in the foreign exchange and the forint market), the
central bank balance sheet will constitute a closed unit; in
other words, changes in items on the asset or liability side will
be eventually reflected by two-week bill flows.
7
Until the autumn of 2008 the central bank assumed a passive
stance: it practically refrained from purchasing government
securities and did not offer any substantial loans to banks.
Flows in the two-week bill holdings during that period
almost exclusively reflected developments in the account
balance of the government’s account.
From the autumn of 2008, however, in an attempt to relieve
mounting liquidity tensions in the banking sector, the MNB
proceeded to intervene actively, which generated new items
on the asset side (government securities purchases, bank
lending), moreover, the reserve ratio was lowered as well. The
impact of these transactions, nevertheless, was still negligible
compared to the effects of government transactions; even in
this period, therefore, changes in the volume of two-week bills
continued to be driven by the latter. The increase in foreign
currency reserves was initially caused by the growing volume
of government deposits (disbursement of the IMF and EU
credit facility), but government spending eventually generated
growth in banks’ account balances, which in turn triggered a
record surge in holdings of two-week bills. This process is
clearly reflected by the fact that, compared to early 2008, the
increase in foreign currency reserves was gradually
approached by the growth in the holdings of two week bills.
THERE IS NO DIRECT LINK BETWEEN 
THE BASE RATE AND THE VOLUME OF
TWO-WEEK MNB BILLS
The interest rate on the two-week bill is the depository of the
excess liquidity banks face, but do not need to comply with
the minimum reserve requirement. Consequently, the base
rate will be the key rate for all their transactions with the
same maturity, which means that domestic economic actors
(households and companies) as well as non-resident investors
in the forint markets will have an opportunity to deposit
funds with or receive loans from domestic banks at an
interest rate close to the base rate. At the same time – along
with expectations about the future path of the central bank
base rate – longer-term yields are fundamentally influenced
by the risk appetite of market participants and their inflation
expectations.
In the current monetary policy system, a potential interest
rate adjustment by the central bank will not change any item
in the central bank’s balance sheet in itself; therefore it will
not change the volume of the MNB bills either. This has not
always been the case. In the narrow-band, crawling peg
exchange rate regime, raising the base rate could increase the
volume of the key policy instrument. All other factors being
equal (e.g. country risk), a higher interest rate level
encourages the forint investments of non-residents, driving
up the forint exchange rate relative to other currencies. In
the narrow-band exchange rate regime, the exchange rate hit
the strong edge of the band fairly soon (indeed, it practically
always stayed around the strong edge), at which point the
MNB was forced to intervene (through foreign currency
purchases) in order to prevent a further appreciation of the
exchange rate. This increased foreign currency reserves and
generated a forint liquidity surplus, resulting in a flow into
the key policy instrument (which was the one-month, and
later the two-week deposit at the time), driving up its
volume.
The exchange rate regime maintained in the period of 2001-
2008 was also fixed, albeit at a wider band (±15%), and thus
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 2
Cumulative changes in the MNB’s main balance
sheet items from 1 January 2008
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7Transactions between the state and the MNB may represent an exception. In the case of government borrowings denominated in a foreign currency, the increase in
the foreign currency reserves overlaps with an increase in the government’s foreign currency deposit account with the central bank. However, it is typical of public
finances that the government raises funds only to the extent needed to cover its expenses; in other words, the government’s deposits with the central bank will be
subject to a temporary increase only. As the government gradually depletes these funds, the declining balance of the government’s account will generate a parallel
increase in the volume of the two-week bills, as shown above.theoretically the MNB continued to have an intervention
obligation at the edges of the band. In early 2003, the interest
rate level was favourable relative to investors’ risk appetite,
which strengthened the forint exchange rate to such an
extent that a central bank intervention (forint sale and
foreign currency purchase) was required at the strong edge of
the fluctuation band. Again, this move simultaneously
increased the liquidity surplus of the banking sector and the
foreign currency reserves. Apart from this single case,
however, there have not been any interventions at the band
edge since 2001, i.e. this factor has no longer influenced the
excess liquidity of the banking sector.
On the other hand, there is currently no direct link between
the base rate and the volume of two-week MNB bills. The
MNB has no intervention obligation in the free-floating
exchange rate system adopted in early 2008, and thus non-
resident capital inflows or outflows can no longer influence
the level of foreign currency reserves, which means that they
have no impact on the level of excess liquidity or the volume
of MNB bills. Consequently, with the credit rating being
equal, an interest rate increase by the central bank can freely
exert its strengthening effect on the forint exchange rate
without influencing the central bank’s balance sheet or
increasing the volume of the two-week bills.
THE LARGE VOLUME OF MNB BILLS
DOES NOT REDUCE THE DEMAND FOR
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
Based on the above, in terms of the liquidity of the banking
sector, the government’s accounts with the central bank
deserve special attention. The Hungarian State Treasury
makes payments for the forint expenses of public
organisations from the Single Treasury Account (KESZ), and
credits their revenues to the same account. The Government
Debt Management Agency (ÁKK Zrt.) is responsible for
liquidity management, in other words, it has to ensure that
the account has a sufficient balance to make the required
payments. ÁKK raises the funds required for the financing of
public expenses from forint or foreign currency sources;
therefore in addition to KESZ, the central bank manages a
foreign currency account for the government for FX
transactions, and provides a conversion opportunity between
the two accounts.
Changes in the balance of KESZ significantly affect the
liquidity position of banks. If payment of government
expenses depletes the KESZ balance, the liquidity of the
banking sector increases, which in turn will raise the volume
of two-week bills. On the other hand, tax payments increase
the KESZ balance, which reduces the liquidity (two-week bill
portfolio) of banks, while the level of KESZ increases.
If the central budget was in equilibrium constantly during the
year, i.e. revenues equalled expenses, the KESZ balance
would also remain constant and Treasury transactions would
have no effect on the overall liquidity of the banking system.
However, revenues and expenses cannot be in balance in any
case on account of different patterns within the year and
within the months; in addition, the financial year is typically
characterised by a deficit. Thus the ÁKK is responsible for
financing the temporary and permanent deficits, and it
depends on the method of financing as to how this impacts
the banking sector’s liquidity.
If the ÁKK covers the deficit from the issuance of forint-
denominated government securities (i.e. the new issuance
exceeds the volume of maturing government papers), the
liquidity of the banking sector will remain unchanged. Even
though the issuance of government securities would reduce
the liquidity of the banking sector, this would be offset by the
budgetary expenditure. Obviously, the liquidity position of
the banking sector may fluctuate depending on intra year
patterns, but its yearly average would not change.
On the other hand, if the government finances the deficit from
the issuance of foreign currency bonds, foreign currency
borrowings or any other foreign currency source (e.g. EU
funds), the liquidity of the banking sector will increase.
Indeed, in order to ensure that only one state agent, notably
the central bank, executes high volume foreign currency
transactions, rather than using the interbank FX market, the
government converts all of its foreign exchange revenues into
forint at the central bank. At this point, however, the MNB
becomes an active party in the transaction, which changes the
structure of the central bank’s balance sheet. Initially, the
foreign currency reserves of the MNB and the KESZ account
balance will increase, but eventually the government
expenditure will result in the expansion of the banking
sector’s liquidity. In summary, if the government finances the
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Chart 3
Impact of the financing of government expenses on
the volume of two-week bills
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raise the MNB bill stock.deficit through foreign currency borrowing, the two-week bill
portfolio of banks will increase.
Most of the past year saw this very process. As investors’ risk
appetite diminished, the path of Hungarian government debt
took a downturn, and the liquidity of the domestic secondary
market of government paper deteriorated as well, as
investors’ demand for government paper declined. In
consideration of the dwindling demand for government
paper, the ÁKK reduced its forint issuances, and relied
increasingly on international borrowings. While the
conversion of foreign currency loans into forint at the MNB
increased foreign currency reserves, the forint payments
made by the Treasury (classic expenses, payment of maturing
and repurchased forint-denominated government securities)
increased forint liquidity, which eventually resulted in an
inflated volume of MNB bills.
Therefore, it was not the large volume of two-week bills that
caused a decline in the demand for forint-denominated
government paper; instead, the declining demand in the
market of government paper – which was caused by other
factors – led to an increase in foreign currency financing,
which inevitably generated a surge in MNB bills.
RATHER THAN BEING AN OBSTACLE, 
THE LARGE VOLUME OF MNB BILLS
SUPPORTS, ALBEIT DOES NOT
GUARANTEE AN UPSWING IN BANK
LENDING
If lending picks up, banks’ balance sheets will expand as
money disbursed in the form of loans will be re-channelled
into the banking system as a deposit, which is then used to
finance further loans.
8 On the other hand, a rebound in
lending may generate a demand for liquidity at the level of
individual banks, because the borrowing company or
household may make payments to an account with another
bank (e.g. is involved in an investment project, or purchases
a home or consumer goods that require a bank transfer). The
account manager bank must ensure that its central bank
accounts have sufficient funds to make this payment: in other
words, its demand for liquidity will be this much higher.
Under normal market conditions, this bank should stand a
good chance of obtaining this liquidity either in the interbank
market or directly from the bank that will end up with the
extra liquidity as a result of the payment, or it may even get
access to liquidity indirectly, through another bank.
In addition, the lending bank may obtain the necessary
liquidity from other banks through other means of
financing (e.g. deposit redemption). Since the lending
involved in these transactions does not concern the MNB in
any way, it has no effect on either the central bank’s balance
sheet, or the liquidity surplus, or the volume of the MNB
bills. Only in case of market turbulences may the MNB play
a role. In such cases, the bank with a liquidity demand has
several options as to how to obtain the required central
bank money. On the one hand, it may quote less MNB bills
than its maturing stock, thereby reducing its MNB bill
portfolio. However, the bank on the receiving end of the
transfer will face excess liquidity and will therefore increase
its two-week bill portfolio by the same amount.
Consequently, the volume of bills in the overall banking
sector will not decline. Ultimately, the specific bank may
also borrow money from the central bank (against sufficient
security collateral, i.e. government paper, MNB bills, etc.),
but this would typically imply worse conditions than those
prevailing in the market. Again, in this case lending would
not decrease, but rather increase the volume of two-week
bills in the banking sector. Indeed, while the lender bank
will not reduce its bill portfolio, the excess liquidity
generated by the customer’s transfer will wind up at another
bank in the banking sector in any case, and that bank will
hold those funds in two-week bills.
Therefore, a large portfolio of MNB bills means that the
holder has liquidity reserves: on the one hand, it is a short-
maturity (two-week) liquid asset; on the other hand, it is
accepted at any time by the central bank as collateral for
loans (overnight, collateralised loans). Consequently, a large
bill portfolio reduces the liquidity risk associated with
lending.
Although banks’ restricted liquidity in the second half of
2008 significantly contributed to the downturn in lending, on
its own, the improvement in liquidity conditions in the first
quarter of 2009 could have increased banks’ lending activity
already. Banks’ holdings of two-week bills strongly supported
the improvement in liquidity conditions. Nevertheless, the
declining risk appetite of banks (they were unwilling to take
worsening credit risks) and the deteriorating economic
prospects led to a sustained decline in lending. Due to sector-
specific problems, the deterioration further intensified for
corporate lending, while in the case of households the
worsening prospects of the housing market contributed to a
sustained downturn in lending.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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8 Only a small fraction of the deposit growth deriving from lending winds up with the MNB – currently only 2%, i.e. the specific portion of the minimum reserves – and
even that portion is deposited to the central bank accounts of banks rather than held in MNB bills. Therefore, the banking sector’s demand for central bank money to
support its lending is limited to this small amount.On the whole, the growing volume of MNB bills gradually
improved banks’ liquidity position and supported their
lending activity; however, driven by other, more powerful
factors, they were forced to restrain their lending supply.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the correlations between the balance sheet items of
the central bank, we demonstrated that it was primarily the
foreign currency financing of the government that accounted
for the tripling in the volume of MNB bills over the past year.
The large volume of the key policy instrument is therefore
the consequence of subdued demand in the government
securities market rather than the reason for it, and hence the
inevitable foreign currency borrowing of the government.
We do not see a direct link between the substantial volume
of bills and the relatively high key policy rate, because a
change in the overall volume of MNB bills can only be
triggered by a change in another central bank balance sheet
item. Adjusting the interest rate, however, does not prompt
a central bank intervention in the foreign currency market
under the current exchange rate regime, and there is no
other direct link between the base rate and the liquidity of
the banking sector. At the same time, serving as banks’
liquidity reserves, the mounting volumes of two-week bills
support a rebound in lending. Nevertheless, for the recovery
of lending activity, the risk appetite of banks will have to
improve as well.
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Chart 4
Factors contributing to changes in credit standards
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Source: MNB lending survey, August 2009.